Interview in Gulan Media: Spain can offer useful comparisons, but its system should not be confused with Iraq's
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo is a distinguished Spanish constitutional law scholar and Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Granada, where he has taught and conducted research for more than three decades. Widely recognized for his contributions to constitutional theory and comparative constitutional studies, his academic work focuses on federalism, fundamental rights, constitutional governance, and the constitutional limits of governmental power.
With more than 200 scholarly publications to his credit, Professor Ruiz Robledo has contributed extensively to constitutional debates in Spain and internationally, with his research appearing in academic publications across Europe and the Americas. Among his major works is Constitutional Law in Spain (Kluwer Law International, 4rd edition, 2026), a comprehensive study of Spain's constitutional framework, institutional structure, and territorial organization. His scholarship offers important insights into the relationship between constitutional principles, democratic institutions, and the distribution of public authority.
Throughout his academic career, Professor Ruiz Robledo has maintained an active international presence as a visiting scholar, lecturer, and participant in major academic conferences. His recent academic engagement at Queen's University in Canada in August 2025 further reflects his commitment to comparative constitutional dialogue and the exchange of perspectives across different legal and political systems. His work combines historical, doctrinal, and comparative approaches to examining the challenges confronting contemporary constitutional democracies.
In this interview, Professor Ruiz Robledo discusses the distinctive characteristics of Spain's constitutional model, particularly its approach to territorial decentralization and the relationship between regional autonomy and national unity. The conversation also explores broader questions concerning comparative constitutional law, the protection of fundamental rights, constitutional adjudication, democratic governance, and the constitutional limitations of governmental authority.
Particular attention is given to the relevance of Spain's constitutional experience to Iraq's federal system and the relationship between the Federal Government and the Kurdistan Region. Through a comparative examination of constitutional arrangements, the interview addresses fundamental questions concerning the division of powers, regional autonomy, constitutional dispute resolution, and the allocation of resources within a unified constitutional framework.
Drawing on more than three decades of academic experience and an extensive body of comparative constitutional research, Professor Ruiz Robledo offers valuable perspectives on the possibilities and challenges of constitutional governance in increasingly complex political and institutional environments.
Gulan: Spain's constitutional structure is thoroughly described in your book "Constitutional Law in Spain". What do you think are the most unique aspects of the Spanish constitutional model, especially when viewed from a comparative constitutional viewpoint, after more than thirty years of study and instruction in constitutional law?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: The most distinctive feature of Spain's constitutional system is its combination of national unity, regional autonomy and parliamentary democracy.
Spain adopter the 1978 Constitution after almost forty years of dictatorship. It established democracy, freedom, political pluralism and the rule of law, while also recognising Spain's territorial diversity. It distinguished between "nationalities" and "regions", but did not identify which territories belonged to each group or establish a complete regional map.
The system that developed afterwards gave all 17 Autonomous Communities their own parliament, so the original distinction became less important. But the territorial question was not settled. The 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, which was supported by the Socialist government but opposed by the main opposition party, the Conservative PP, contributed to a serious institutional crisis and, in 2017, an unsuccessful attempt at secession.
My conclusion is that Spain's Autonomous State remains an evolving system. Since 1978, the general direction has been towards greater regional powers. Its main challenge is to combine this evolution with stable, shared constitutional rules.
Gulan: Despite not being a federal state, Spain is frequently referred to as a highly decentralized state. What lessons, if any, can nations attempting to strike a balance between real regional autonomy and national unity learn from Spain's experience? How would you describe the development of Spain's territorial organization system?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Spain shows that regional autonomy and national unity need not be enemies. A country can recognise different regional identities and give regional governments substantial powers within a common constitutional framework.
The Spanish system developed gradually. This helped transform a highly centralised dictatorship into a strongly decentralised democracy, but it also left important questions open. In my view, the Constitution's failure to establish a clear regional map has caused more problems than benefits, because it left the decentralisation process open-ended.
The main lesson is that constitutional rules must define powers clearly while leaving room for political negotiation. Autonomy also needs institutions, adequate resources and effective legal guarantees. It cannot depend only on the goodwill of the central government.
Gulan: Comparative constitutional law has benefited greatly from your research. How, in your opinion, can comparing various constitutional systems improve our comprehension of core ideas like democracy, the rule of law, constitutional supremacy, and the separation of powers?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Comparative constitutional law helps us understand our own system by examining how other countries address similar problems. Constitutions may use the same words-such as democracy, freedom and the rule of law-but their meaning and operation depend on each country's legal and political context.
For example, presidential systems separate the executive and legislature, while parliamentary systems depend on the relationship between the government and parliament. Neither model automatically guarantees good government or effective limits on power.
We can learn from other countries, but we should not copy their institutions without considering their history, party system and social conditions. Constitutional law is a universal field of study, but its solutions must be assessed in context. The aim is to understand how constitutional rules can protect freedom and limit public power.
Gulan: One of the continuing challenges for constitutional democracies is finding an appropriate balance between the protection of fundamental rights and competing public interests. What constitutional principles should guide governments and courts when fundamental rights come into tension with concerns such as public security, public order, or other collective interests?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Fundamental rights are legal guarantees, not simply political promises. In Spain, some laws that develop fundamental rights require a special parliamentary majority, which helps protect their stability.
Rights are not always absolute, and governments may sometimes need to protect public security, public health or the rights of others. But any restriction must satisfy three principles recognised in the case law of the Spanish Constitutional Court: legality, necessity and proportionality.
A restriction must have a clear legal basis and pursue a legitimate objective. It must also be genuinely necessary, and its benefits must justify the harm to rights. If a less restrictive measure can achieve the same objective, it should normally be preferred.
Courts must examine these questions independently. Governments must justify restrictions on freedom; invoking the public interest is not, by itself, enough to make a measure constitutional.
Gulan: You have written a great deal about the boundaries of governmental authority. Which constitutional provisions do you think are especially crucial for avoiding the consolidation or misuse of public authority, and how can these provisions continue to be valid and effective in times of institutional or political crisis?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: The basic principle is that all public authorities are subject to the Constitution and the law. Article 9.1 of the Spanish Constitution establishes this rule, while Article 9.3 protects the rule of law, legal certainty and the prohibition of arbitrary action by public authorities.
The separation of powers, independent courts and constitutional review are also essential. However, institutions are only as effective as their design and practice. In Spain, appointments to the Constitutional Court are strongly influenced by political-party agreements, which can make judges' decisions seem predictable along party lines and weaken public confidence.
I have even proposed an alternative method: candidates who meet the legal requirements would be considered openly; political parties could exclude unsuitable candidates; and the final appointments would be made by lot from a limited shortlist. The aim would be to reduce candidates' dependence on the parties that support them.
One of my main research interests is the legal control of arbitrariness. Public authorities must give reasons for their decisions and respect legal limits. These guarantees matter especially during crises, when the temptation to bypass constitutional rules may be strongest.
Gulan: You have had the chance to see constitutional discussions in several democratic systems due to your considerable academic involvement in Europe and the Americas, including your most recent stay at Queen's University in Canada. What issues do you think these systems have in common, and where do you think they differ most in how they address those issues?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Democracies on both sides of the Atlantic face political polarisation, declining trust in institutions, conflicts between governments and parliaments, and disputes over executive power. Another danger is the partisan use of constitutional institutions: political parties may defend an institution when it supports them and attack it when it does not.
The institutional responses differ. In presidential systems, the executive and legislature have separate democratic mandates. In parliamentary systems such as Spain's, the government depends on parliamentary confidence. Federal states divide powers constitutionally between levels of government, while other states use different forms of decentralisation.
My academic stays in Canada, Australia and India have reinforced one point: territorial disputes are not purely legal. They also involve identity, history and public resources. Comparative law helps us understand these common challenges without assuming that one solution will work everywhere.
Gulan: Constitutional courts are becoming more and more crucial in settling politically delicate conflicts between legislatures, governments, and fundamental rights. How does constitutional adjudication strike a balance between respect for democratic institutions and elected bodies' decisions and the courts' obligation to defend constitutional principles?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Constitutional courts must respect the democratic legitimacy of elected representatives while ensuring that majorities remain within constitutional limits. The key distinction is between political disagreement and a genuine constitutional violation.
Courts should not replace parliament's political choices with their own preferences. They should explain, through clear legal reasoning, whether a decision complies with the Constitution. Their independence and impartiality are essential, as is the way judges are appointed.
Spain illustrates the difficulty. Political conflict over judicial appointments, and the perception that judges belong to conservative or progressive camps, can weaken confidence in the Constitutional Court. The answer is not to reduce judicial independence, but to strengthen the quality of legal reasoning and ensure that judges act as judges, not as representatives of the parties that supported their appointment (see question 5).
Gulan: You explored the political and constitutional conflicts pertaining to Canada's federal system in your 1995 article, "The Canadian Constitutional Crisis." What features of the Canadian experience, in your opinion, are still especially pertinent to comprehending constitutional disputes in federal or decentralized governments, particularly when territorial autonomy and national unity are at stake?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Canada shows that even a long-established democracy can face difficult questions about national unity, regional autonomy and distinct linguistic or cultural identities.
A recent example is the Alberta referendum of 19 October 2026: about three-quarters of voters rejected
starting the legal process for a future binding referendum on separation. It was not itself a direct vote on independence, but it showed clear support for remaining in Canada.
My 1995 article, "The Canadian Constitutional Crisis", examined the challenges raised by territorial disagreement. A lasting lesson is that constitutional rules and political dialogue must work together. Courts can clarify the law and the division of powers, but they cannot remove every political disagreement or replace negotiation.
A stable constitutional system must allow regional identities to be expressed while maintaining a shared legal framework. Unity does not require complete cultural or political uniformity; it requires agreement on the rules for managing differences and resolving disputes.
Gulan: You look at the constitutional aspect of Spain's autonomous communities and how they relate to the larger Spanish constitutional system in your book "Sub-National Constitutional Law in Spain (2018)". What can be learned about the form of regional autonomy while preserving constitutional coherence from Spain's experience with sub-national constitutional law, and how may this apply to the relationship between the Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi federal government?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Spain can offer useful comparisons, but its system should not be confused with Iraq's. Spain is not formally a federal state, although it has many federal features. Iraq's 2005 Constitution explicitly establishes a federal system and recognises the Kurdistan Region as a federal region.
The central lesson is that autonomy requires a workable division of powers, clear rules governing the relationship between regional and national law, effective procedures for resolving disputes, and sufficient financial resources. Regional authorities need genuine powers to govern, but they must exercise them within the common constitutional framework.
The Iraqi Constitution already provides a legal basis for federalism. The challenge is to make those guarantees effective in practice. Spain should be treated as a source of comparative experience, not as a model to copy wholesale.
Gulan: What lessons from Spain's experience might be applicable to the constitutional relationship between the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdistan Region, especially with regard to the division of powers, the settlement of constitutional disputes, the allocation of resources, and the preservation of regional autonomy within a single constitutional framework, given your knowledge of federalism and comparative constitutional law?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: I would stress three priorities. First, both levels of government should respect the constitutional division of powers and agree on procedures for areas that require cooperation.
Second, disputes need independent and effective resolution. Neither the federal government nor the Kurdistan Region should be the final judge of the limits of its own powers. Decisions should be made through fair procedures and supported by clear legal reasoning.
Third, financial relations-especially the distribution of public revenues and the management of oil and gas-need predictable rules and reliable implementation. Repeated disputes over budgets and resources can undermine the whole constitutional system.
Above all, federalism requires what might be called a "federal political culture": respect for the Constitution and for the responsibilities of both levels of government. The federal government must respect regional autonomy, and regional authorities must respect the common constitutional framework. Federalism should not produce a permanent winner and loser; it should allow communities to govern themselves while remaining part of the same state.
With more than 200 scholarly publications to his credit, Professor Ruiz Robledo has contributed extensively to constitutional debates in Spain and internationally, with his research appearing in academic publications across Europe and the Americas. Among his major works is Constitutional Law in Spain (Kluwer Law International, 4rd edition, 2026), a comprehensive study of Spain's constitutional framework, institutional structure, and territorial organization. His scholarship offers important insights into the relationship between constitutional principles, democratic institutions, and the distribution of public authority.
Throughout his academic career, Professor Ruiz Robledo has maintained an active international presence as a visiting scholar, lecturer, and participant in major academic conferences. His recent academic engagement at Queen's University in Canada in August 2025 further reflects his commitment to comparative constitutional dialogue and the exchange of perspectives across different legal and political systems. His work combines historical, doctrinal, and comparative approaches to examining the challenges confronting contemporary constitutional democracies.
In this interview, Professor Ruiz Robledo discusses the distinctive characteristics of Spain's constitutional model, particularly its approach to territorial decentralization and the relationship between regional autonomy and national unity. The conversation also explores broader questions concerning comparative constitutional law, the protection of fundamental rights, constitutional adjudication, democratic governance, and the constitutional limitations of governmental authority.
Particular attention is given to the relevance of Spain's constitutional experience to Iraq's federal system and the relationship between the Federal Government and the Kurdistan Region. Through a comparative examination of constitutional arrangements, the interview addresses fundamental questions concerning the division of powers, regional autonomy, constitutional dispute resolution, and the allocation of resources within a unified constitutional framework.
Drawing on more than three decades of academic experience and an extensive body of comparative constitutional research, Professor Ruiz Robledo offers valuable perspectives on the possibilities and challenges of constitutional governance in increasingly complex political and institutional environments.
Gulan: Spain's constitutional structure is thoroughly described in your book "Constitutional Law in Spain". What do you think are the most unique aspects of the Spanish constitutional model, especially when viewed from a comparative constitutional viewpoint, after more than thirty years of study and instruction in constitutional law?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: The most distinctive feature of Spain's constitutional system is its combination of national unity, regional autonomy and parliamentary democracy.
Spain adopter the 1978 Constitution after almost forty years of dictatorship. It established democracy, freedom, political pluralism and the rule of law, while also recognising Spain's territorial diversity. It distinguished between "nationalities" and "regions", but did not identify which territories belonged to each group or establish a complete regional map.
The system that developed afterwards gave all 17 Autonomous Communities their own parliament, so the original distinction became less important. But the territorial question was not settled. The 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, which was supported by the Socialist government but opposed by the main opposition party, the Conservative PP, contributed to a serious institutional crisis and, in 2017, an unsuccessful attempt at secession.
My conclusion is that Spain's Autonomous State remains an evolving system. Since 1978, the general direction has been towards greater regional powers. Its main challenge is to combine this evolution with stable, shared constitutional rules.
Gulan: Despite not being a federal state, Spain is frequently referred to as a highly decentralized state. What lessons, if any, can nations attempting to strike a balance between real regional autonomy and national unity learn from Spain's experience? How would you describe the development of Spain's territorial organization system?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Spain shows that regional autonomy and national unity need not be enemies. A country can recognise different regional identities and give regional governments substantial powers within a common constitutional framework.
The Spanish system developed gradually. This helped transform a highly centralised dictatorship into a strongly decentralised democracy, but it also left important questions open. In my view, the Constitution's failure to establish a clear regional map has caused more problems than benefits, because it left the decentralisation process open-ended.
The main lesson is that constitutional rules must define powers clearly while leaving room for political negotiation. Autonomy also needs institutions, adequate resources and effective legal guarantees. It cannot depend only on the goodwill of the central government.
Gulan: Comparative constitutional law has benefited greatly from your research. How, in your opinion, can comparing various constitutional systems improve our comprehension of core ideas like democracy, the rule of law, constitutional supremacy, and the separation of powers?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Comparative constitutional law helps us understand our own system by examining how other countries address similar problems. Constitutions may use the same words-such as democracy, freedom and the rule of law-but their meaning and operation depend on each country's legal and political context.
For example, presidential systems separate the executive and legislature, while parliamentary systems depend on the relationship between the government and parliament. Neither model automatically guarantees good government or effective limits on power.
We can learn from other countries, but we should not copy their institutions without considering their history, party system and social conditions. Constitutional law is a universal field of study, but its solutions must be assessed in context. The aim is to understand how constitutional rules can protect freedom and limit public power.
Gulan: One of the continuing challenges for constitutional democracies is finding an appropriate balance between the protection of fundamental rights and competing public interests. What constitutional principles should guide governments and courts when fundamental rights come into tension with concerns such as public security, public order, or other collective interests?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Fundamental rights are legal guarantees, not simply political promises. In Spain, some laws that develop fundamental rights require a special parliamentary majority, which helps protect their stability.
Rights are not always absolute, and governments may sometimes need to protect public security, public health or the rights of others. But any restriction must satisfy three principles recognised in the case law of the Spanish Constitutional Court: legality, necessity and proportionality.
A restriction must have a clear legal basis and pursue a legitimate objective. It must also be genuinely necessary, and its benefits must justify the harm to rights. If a less restrictive measure can achieve the same objective, it should normally be preferred.
Courts must examine these questions independently. Governments must justify restrictions on freedom; invoking the public interest is not, by itself, enough to make a measure constitutional.
Gulan: You have written a great deal about the boundaries of governmental authority. Which constitutional provisions do you think are especially crucial for avoiding the consolidation or misuse of public authority, and how can these provisions continue to be valid and effective in times of institutional or political crisis?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: The basic principle is that all public authorities are subject to the Constitution and the law. Article 9.1 of the Spanish Constitution establishes this rule, while Article 9.3 protects the rule of law, legal certainty and the prohibition of arbitrary action by public authorities.
The separation of powers, independent courts and constitutional review are also essential. However, institutions are only as effective as their design and practice. In Spain, appointments to the Constitutional Court are strongly influenced by political-party agreements, which can make judges' decisions seem predictable along party lines and weaken public confidence.
I have even proposed an alternative method: candidates who meet the legal requirements would be considered openly; political parties could exclude unsuitable candidates; and the final appointments would be made by lot from a limited shortlist. The aim would be to reduce candidates' dependence on the parties that support them.
One of my main research interests is the legal control of arbitrariness. Public authorities must give reasons for their decisions and respect legal limits. These guarantees matter especially during crises, when the temptation to bypass constitutional rules may be strongest.
Gulan: You have had the chance to see constitutional discussions in several democratic systems due to your considerable academic involvement in Europe and the Americas, including your most recent stay at Queen's University in Canada. What issues do you think these systems have in common, and where do you think they differ most in how they address those issues?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Democracies on both sides of the Atlantic face political polarisation, declining trust in institutions, conflicts between governments and parliaments, and disputes over executive power. Another danger is the partisan use of constitutional institutions: political parties may defend an institution when it supports them and attack it when it does not.
The institutional responses differ. In presidential systems, the executive and legislature have separate democratic mandates. In parliamentary systems such as Spain's, the government depends on parliamentary confidence. Federal states divide powers constitutionally between levels of government, while other states use different forms of decentralisation.
My academic stays in Canada, Australia and India have reinforced one point: territorial disputes are not purely legal. They also involve identity, history and public resources. Comparative law helps us understand these common challenges without assuming that one solution will work everywhere.
Gulan: Constitutional courts are becoming more and more crucial in settling politically delicate conflicts between legislatures, governments, and fundamental rights. How does constitutional adjudication strike a balance between respect for democratic institutions and elected bodies' decisions and the courts' obligation to defend constitutional principles?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Constitutional courts must respect the democratic legitimacy of elected representatives while ensuring that majorities remain within constitutional limits. The key distinction is between political disagreement and a genuine constitutional violation.
Courts should not replace parliament's political choices with their own preferences. They should explain, through clear legal reasoning, whether a decision complies with the Constitution. Their independence and impartiality are essential, as is the way judges are appointed.
Spain illustrates the difficulty. Political conflict over judicial appointments, and the perception that judges belong to conservative or progressive camps, can weaken confidence in the Constitutional Court. The answer is not to reduce judicial independence, but to strengthen the quality of legal reasoning and ensure that judges act as judges, not as representatives of the parties that supported their appointment (see question 5).
Gulan: You explored the political and constitutional conflicts pertaining to Canada's federal system in your 1995 article, "The Canadian Constitutional Crisis." What features of the Canadian experience, in your opinion, are still especially pertinent to comprehending constitutional disputes in federal or decentralized governments, particularly when territorial autonomy and national unity are at stake?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Canada shows that even a long-established democracy can face difficult questions about national unity, regional autonomy and distinct linguistic or cultural identities.
A recent example is the Alberta referendum of 19 October 2026: about three-quarters of voters rejected
starting the legal process for a future binding referendum on separation. It was not itself a direct vote on independence, but it showed clear support for remaining in Canada.
My 1995 article, "The Canadian Constitutional Crisis", examined the challenges raised by territorial disagreement. A lasting lesson is that constitutional rules and political dialogue must work together. Courts can clarify the law and the division of powers, but they cannot remove every political disagreement or replace negotiation.
A stable constitutional system must allow regional identities to be expressed while maintaining a shared legal framework. Unity does not require complete cultural or political uniformity; it requires agreement on the rules for managing differences and resolving disputes.
Gulan: You look at the constitutional aspect of Spain's autonomous communities and how they relate to the larger Spanish constitutional system in your book "Sub-National Constitutional Law in Spain (2018)". What can be learned about the form of regional autonomy while preserving constitutional coherence from Spain's experience with sub-national constitutional law, and how may this apply to the relationship between the Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi federal government?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: Spain can offer useful comparisons, but its system should not be confused with Iraq's. Spain is not formally a federal state, although it has many federal features. Iraq's 2005 Constitution explicitly establishes a federal system and recognises the Kurdistan Region as a federal region.
The central lesson is that autonomy requires a workable division of powers, clear rules governing the relationship between regional and national law, effective procedures for resolving disputes, and sufficient financial resources. Regional authorities need genuine powers to govern, but they must exercise them within the common constitutional framework.
The Iraqi Constitution already provides a legal basis for federalism. The challenge is to make those guarantees effective in practice. Spain should be treated as a source of comparative experience, not as a model to copy wholesale.
Gulan: What lessons from Spain's experience might be applicable to the constitutional relationship between the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdistan Region, especially with regard to the division of powers, the settlement of constitutional disputes, the allocation of resources, and the preservation of regional autonomy within a single constitutional framework, given your knowledge of federalism and comparative constitutional law?
Professor Dr. Agustín Ruiz Robledo: I would stress three priorities. First, both levels of government should respect the constitutional division of powers and agree on procedures for areas that require cooperation.
Second, disputes need independent and effective resolution. Neither the federal government nor the Kurdistan Region should be the final judge of the limits of its own powers. Decisions should be made through fair procedures and supported by clear legal reasoning.
Third, financial relations-especially the distribution of public revenues and the management of oil and gas-need predictable rules and reliable implementation. Repeated disputes over budgets and resources can undermine the whole constitutional system.
Above all, federalism requires what might be called a "federal political culture": respect for the Constitution and for the responsibilities of both levels of government. The federal government must respect regional autonomy, and regional authorities must respect the common constitutional framework. Federalism should not produce a permanent winner and loser; it should allow communities to govern themselves while remaining part of the same state.
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